Thompson v. North American Stainless, L.P.
131 S. Ct. 863 (2011)

On January 24, 2011, in a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court, with the exception of Justice Kagan who recused herself, the Court held an employer may be liable under Title VII for retaliating against an employee who is claiming discrimination by firing the employee’s fiancé. In addition, the Court held the fiancé does have standing under Title VII to sue the employer for being fired.

Eric Thompson (Eric) and Miriam Regalado (Miriam) were engaged and both employees of North American Stainless (NAS). Miriam filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against NAS for sex discrimination, and NAS was notified of the charges in February 2003. Shortly after NAS was notified of Miriam’s charge Eric was fired. Subsequently, Eric filed a claim with the EEOC against NAS for retaliation. In his claim, Eric alleged he was fired by NAS in retaliation for Miriam’s sex discrimination charge.

Based on these facts, the Court decided two issues. First, was it unlawful for NAS to fire Eric? Second, did Eric have the right to bring an action against NAS for violating Title VII? Regarding the first issue, the Court broadly interpreted Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. The Court stated, “[w]e think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiancé would be fired.”¹ NAS did not deny this argument, but in the alternative, NAS questioned where the Court would draw the line on various other relationships, including close friends or boyfriends and girlfriends? The Court acknowledged NAS’ concerns, but refused to establish specific relationships in which third-party retaliation would be unlawful under Title VII. The Court insisted the decision of establishing which third-parties may be protected must remain objective in order to ‘avoi[d] the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.’²

The second issue, determining whether or not Eric may bring an action against NAS, was more complicated. Here, the argument revolved around who is considered an “aggrieved person” under Title VII. Eric argued this provision merely intended that an “aggrieved person” be a person who has Constitutional standing to sue under Article III. Conversely, NAS argued an “aggrieved person” under Title VII only referred to the person engaging in a protected activity. However, the Court rejected both these views for being too extreme, and instead, the Court adopted the definition of “aggrieved person” as stated in the Administrative Procedure Act. Under this definition, a plaintiff may sue if they fit within a “zone of interests.”³ The “zone of interests” test prevents a plaintiff from suing if his or her “interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.”⁴ This would allow people who were intended to be protected by Title VII to bring suit, while excluding other individuals who may have Constitutional standing to sue under Article III but whose interests are unrelated to Title VII.

In a brief concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg, she reinforced the majority’s holding by noting the ruling coincided with the EEOC’s longstanding beliefs regarding Title VII. To support her claim, Justice Ginsburg quoted language from the EEOC’s Compliance Manual that mirrored the majority holding in the case. Justice Ginsburg noted this language was particularly important under Skidmore v. Sift & Co.,⁵ which gives deference to the contents of the Compliance Manual.

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¹ Thompson v. North Am. Stainless, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
² Id. at 868-69 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68-69 (2006)).
³ Id. at 870.
⁴ Id. at 870.
⁵ 323 U.S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944).